Online, Offline, and Hate Crime: Indoctrination and recruitment in the information age

by

Cassiel A. Sabin

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

BACHELOR OF ARTS

Accepted

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Nancy Bonvillain, Thesis Advisor

_____

KellyAnne McGuire, Second Reader

_____

Ian Bickford, Provost and Vice President

Bard College at Simon's Rock
Great Barrington, Massachusetts

May 2019

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Abstract

An exploration of the features of offline recruitment tactics for organized hate groups, how those existent features change when introduced to digital and online spaces, and what new features arise because of the change in medium.

Chapter 0: Introduction

In offline spaces—like public signposts, coffeeshops, and much of human history—the mechanisms for spreading information are well documented, and largely unchanged since the invention of mass media through television and radio broadcasts. With the advent of the information age and emergence of more personal online communications, some of these mechanisms persist, while others adapt to a new situation and provide the same use but either more broadly across recipients or more directly to the intended audience. Still more mechanisms—like implementations of social media, or video and image sharing—are brand new with digital spaces. They are necessarily informed by offline communications as they exist within the same cultural framework, but do not have a direct or oftentimes simple analogue form. Traditional, modified, and new vectors of communication are available to anyone with the requisite technical access, up to and including organized hate groups, and consequently populations previously sheltered from their ideals are made accessible to hate rhetoric, and members of those groups can have their understandings of that rhetoric challenged more and more frequently.

Throughout writing this piece, whenever I was asked what I was working on, my conversation partner would remark about how timely and important an analysis of this sort was. This was confusing, as it felt like this thesis is just the natural culmination of the work I've done as an undergraduate, and as I worked it became clear that there was so much I *couldn't* include. There is at least twice as much to be said about the topics I entertain here, and several rabbit trails that had to be abandoned to make a cohesive

work, even though they would arguably deserve their own documentation. That said, so many of those rabbit trails can be left for later, won't disappear so long as the same archiving mechanisms and cultural memory I used to synthesize what is covered in this work remain intact.

That at least 314 (Aljazeera, 2019; Joffre, 2019; NZ Herald, 2019; Levenson & Sanchez, 2018) lives have been lost to high profile hate attacks on religious and ethnoreligious communities in between October 2018 and May 2019 illustrates the need for this to be articulated. With regards to coverage of those acts of violence in places of worship, the names of the perpetrators will *not* be written out. In each case explored herein, where notoriety was granted by media attention, a component of the perpetrator's publicized motivation has been notoriety. In refusing to republish the names of the aggressors it both undermines their goals as well as pays respect to the souls lost. Violence against minority groups is not limited to places of worship, and nor is the discussion of it in this work; however, because of the nature of the hate groups discussed herein places of worship are especially vulnerable.

Chapter 1: Operational Definitions

The nature of hate groups and what constitutes a minority identity are loosely defined in common parlance, and emotionally charged in the current social climate. The words ‘hate’ and ‘minority,’ specifically, have divisive connotations in ways that are not useful for discussion without explicating what exactly they are being used for. Examining the meanings of the terms used in the context of this work will not erase those connotations, nor should it, but it will render consistent what they are being used to describe in this work. Further, even if the explicated meaning is already contained within a reader’s understanding of a term and its use, it bears restating what component of that understanding is relevant in this specific context, and how this usage is justified.

Ingroup and Outgroup Dynamics

People like groups. We’re social mammals, and so it is to be expected that we form communities around kinship, shared needs, and shared experiences. By identifying oneself with a group, individuals outside of that boundary are necessarily not members of the same group, which results in the conception of ingroups and outgroups. Members of the same ingroup will show a preference for one another over outgroup members, and will value and take pride in the traits that separate their group from the rest (Brewer & Miller, 1996, p. 24). Through the research of Bernard Whitley and Mary Kite, as soon as someone is given the option of identifying oneself as a part of a group, they will have favorable opinions of other members, sight unseen, even without previously feeling one way or another with regards to their membership (2010, p. 83). This isn’t a *bad* thing,

though; community building is important for developing as a society, but the othering that comes from a collective identity can rapidly switch from benign to hostile, frequently devaluing others as a consequence of valuing the ingroup (Whitley & Kite, 2010).

Using examples of a theorised early society, emerging from geographical closeness and kinship, William Sumner postulates that resource distribution and worked territory become a natural basis for ingroup formation. Further, he suggests successful social and survival activities within an ingroup would have been linked to hostility toward members of outgroups; that "[the urgencies] of war with outsiders are what make peace inside, lest internal discord should weaken the we-group for war" (1906, p. 12). Following this, a focus on conflict implies a drift toward ingroup identity becoming more about what the outgroup *lacks* rather than what the ingroup has to draw them together in the first place. In Sumner's example, these distinctions are the initial divide between *us* and *them. We're* from *here*, *they're* from *there;* and so it follows that being *from there* is a simpler form of the negated identity, of being *not from here*. This can be seen in the extreme in the dehumanization of enemies in conflicts, and simply applying to outgroups at large (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014), where the shared attribute for ingroup membership is humanity. Prior to identification as an outgroup or an outgroup member, members of the ingroup viewed others as having humanity. Once the outgroup relation is established, inhumanity follows: through physical and verbal violence, and violence through exclusion or inaction. In turn, this perception further solidifies ingroup identities, and distances them from the outgroups (Sumner, 1906).

Ingroup identities don't need to be formed out of malice, or even on purpose. Through experiment, Henri Tajfel (as cited in Whitley & Kite, 2010) demonstrated that

simply knowing there is a group is enough for people to feel a part or apart. In his study, participants were taken one by one into a room and shown a screen covered in dots. They were asked to estimate the number of dots on the screen, and after they had done so, the researcher explained that people routinely either under- or over-estimate the number of dots; the participant was then informed which category they fell into. The goal of this experimental design was to determine the least amount of sociocultural information needed for people to feel a sociocultural *connection* to a group, and subsequent discrimination against the outgroup. This design then eliminated "face-to-face interaction; conflicts of interest; any possibility of previous hostility between the groups; and 'utilitarian' or instrumental link between the subjects' responses and their self-interest" (Tajfel, 1978, p. 77; as cited in Whitley & Kite, 2010). The groupings of underestimators and overestimators did not have any salience to the participants prior to the test, and weren't a component of the social backdrop in which they lived; further, testing them alone removed any potential feelings about their cohort's results. The participants' groupings, additionally, were entirely randomized.

To then measure ingroup favoritism or lack thereof, participants were asked to decide how much money two other people would receive for their participation in the study. The participants only knew that one of those people was an overestimator, and the other an underestimator. Overall, participants awarded members of the shared classification more currency than they did members of this synthetic outgroup (Whitley & Kite, 2010). This study intended to strip away normal biasing agents in forming group identities, and was successful in indicating that this negative treatment of the outgroup will likely happen without external weight to membership. In addition, it provided

evidence that personal group affinity is influenced by external definitions, given the lack of relationship between how a participant scored on the estimation test and which group they were informed they belonged to.

Without researcher input, participants in Tajfel's experiment wouldn't have known what the groups were that they were being sorted into; this was a necessary feature of the experimental design, but it could be argued that without being directly informed of their membership, participants wouldn't have been so quick to form an identity out of the potential for a group. This charge is irrelevant, however, as no social choice or action is ever made in a vacuum; and it is significantly more likely that in practice ingroup decisions will be made along socially agreed upon identities rather than one prescribed by researchers. This is shown in later studies, indicating the predilection to align oneself with a social identity when provided the opportunity.

Michael Hogg and John Turner designed an experiment to see if this social identity would be allied within an existing ingroup hierarchy. Female and male participants were recruited from a university campus, and initially informed that the study was aimed at describing any differences or similarities between argumentative styles along gender lines. Each participant was given a questionnaire regarding a conflict, either between two people with the same gender as the participant, or between a pair of women and men. They were asked how they would describe a typical member of their gender responding in those situations. Participants were then surveyed on their views on an assortment of topics, such that they could be placed in discussion groups formed along the same lines as the hypothetical situation in the questionnaire—either in groups with someone of like gender who disagreed on a topic, or with both another member of their

own gender with whom they agreed and two from another with whom they disagreed. They were instructed to debate the issue that was used in assigning their experimental groups, and afterward participants were asked to describe themselves with relation to their identity group—male or female—to then be compared with their own reports prior to the experiment and with data from the other group formats (Hogg & Turner, 1987). Following the interactions, participants who had interacted with outgroup members described themselves in terms more strongly tying themselves to the ingroup than in settings where their grouping was unchallenged, emphasizing their own and their groupmate's own femininity or masculinity when reporting on their self concept after these conversations. While Hogg and Turner observed this along the gender presentations of 'male' and 'female,' self stereotyping behavior is not limited to just this grouping.

This identification with an established social group holds, as does ingroup favoritism, whether individual members of a group have any particular personal like or disdain for each other. Judgements about groups at large hold more weight than one-on-one opinions, "it is possible to display preference for an ingroup member we don't like very much, and to discriminate against a member of an outgroup even if we like that individual personally" (Brewer & Miller, 1996, p. 31). We see this in the words of common rhetorical fallacies, along the lines of "I [the speaker] can't hold a bias because someone in my social circle claims that identity." Furthermore, the potential for discrepancy between someone's concept of themself, their acquaintances, and the groups represented is visible when examining internalized oppression, wherein an individual harbours some degree of self hatred because of social norms and may either act negatively toward themselves or regarding other members of their group because of this

stigmatized belief (Pyke, 2010). Granted, marginalized people may not belong to the same group that coins these notions against them, but will also exist as a part of the ingroup created by shared language or geographical region despite other outroup identities. For instance—residents of the United States speaking English as a first language constitute an ingroup, even if there are other delineations within that group that places some of us in a position of privilege over others. Assuming then, that the culture surrounding an individual impacts their views, it follows that beliefs held by one ingroup can easily spread to members of other groups.

Returning to the idea of homogenizing ingroup and outgroup persons is exemplified in the self stereotyping Hogg and Turner mention. The implicit biases in language and the manner in which group identification is presented will reinforce a conception about an entire group that is already provided by the same cultural norms that lead to self stereotyping in the first place. These are the concepts that strengthen an ingroup in Tajfel's model. The language we use to describe ingroups and outgroups on a more practical, societal scale, follow the same line of reasoning that colonialist agendas did: first labelling people along perceived ingroup/outgroup lines; second, establishing an allegedly natural order as defined from the top down by the ruling ingroup; and finally, collecting and managing resources such that they're limited to the members of the same group that did the sorting (Hill, 2009). This can be seen embedded in the way we talk about race in the West, with european white contrasting and all other ethnicities. Further, specifically with an eye toward anti-Black racism, Black and white can be taken to encode more than just melanin, but also whether someone's family history is more likely

to involve voluntary resettlement across an ocean or being stolen and then born into chattel slavery followed by being denied even footing for more than a century.

This shouldn't be news, and it isn't news to at least half of that equation, but language consistency and general cultural knowledge embedded in it is still instrumental in constructing a consistent image of the socially marginalized outgroup, an image so pervasive that even members of that outgroup have no choice but to hold it. This process is evidenced by the initial doll tests by Kenneth Clark and Mamie Clark in the 1940s, recreated and retested since then (Spencer, 2010), demonstrating that bias for white and against Black people was held and measurable even in children under ten. These studies sample five- to eleven-year-old white and Black schoolchildren. The participating children were shown model children of unknown gender with light and dark skin tones and matching hair colors, and asked to show the experimenter which doll or drawing has the trait the experimenter asked about. In the Clarks' work, the children were asked to select the doll that they'd like to play with, that looked bad, that is a nice doll, or is a nice color (1947). Spencer revised these queries to ask participants to indicate the picture of the child they'd rather have as a friend or classmate, and to associate certain positive and negative adjectives with the drawing (2010). Overall, children associated and selected the representations of White children for positive concepts, such as being a good friend or simply being *good*, and the representations of Black children as *bad*, *dumb*, *mean* (Clark & Clark, 1947; Spencer 2010). As participants will make choices that overall benefit their own group in the absence of societal biases, as Tajfel demonstrated, it would be unfounded and irresponsible to ignore the impact an addition of these societal norms would have in allowing starker acts of ingroup favoritism.

So What is a Hate Group?

There do exist definitions as to what constitutes a hate group. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) takes an annual census of hate groups in the United States, with 1,020 active in 2018 (SPLC, 2019), all of which they claim fall under the definition of "an organization that … has beliefs or practices that attack or malign an entire class of people, typically for their immutable characteristics" (SPLC, 2017). This conception of a hate group is a common understanding in academia and laymen conversations, and has been used regularly in the sources referenced in the production of this work.That said, the regular use specifically stipulates an *organization*, a collection of people who have explicitly allied themselves together and knowingly and intentionally work toward some collective goal within the parameters of a hate group as defined by the SPLC. There exist individual acts of hate in the same definition that are not claimed by a specific organized force, and yet have the same effect as one of these group's actions: from individual acts of graffiti and vandalism (Mosbergen, 2018), to lone domestic terrorists (Levenson & Sanchez, 2018). These individuals share a similar ideology to each other, but are likely not acting in concert or even aware of each other specifically. Hypothetically, they could be considered an organized *guerilla* hate group, but the dissonance between guerilla tactics and organized initiatives, and the implied intentional membership to the both of them, don't quite align with these cases. Conceptions of ingroups and outgroups as outlined, though, do not require an intentional alignment with members of the ingroup or even personally positive feelings toward other members. As any majority identity can also be defined as not the minority identities, holding a majority identity causes an individual to automatically act as a member of that ingroup, whether they consciously

decide to or not. Following this, while many examples will be taken from organized hate groups, the term ‘hate group’ will be used to refer to any pattern of majority-identity favoritism combined with beliefs or practices attacking or maligning an entire class of people for immutable characteristics. It could be argued that ‘hate’ is a strong word for what could be garden variety ignorance. To this I propose that intent on the part of the actor does not change whether or not their actions reflect ingroup and outgroup dynamics; and so it *is* an act of hate whether it’s claimed as one or not, and just as membership in an ingroup is implicit, so is membership in this form of hate group.

There exists a focus on treating the issues arising from organized groups and their actions as somehow different from disorganized personal ideologies and the seemingly isolated domestic terrorism favoring the same ingroup. While a mass demonstration has a different and often greater impact than individual action, or is treated as such by media and governing bodies, the actions of an individual have often been influenced by the same ideology that spawned the organized group. This does not negate the lethality on either part; but to assume only organized efforts are truly damaging dangerously ignores real world violence.

Two ideological components are necessary for escalation to violence, be it physical, spoken, or unspoken. First, the actor must possess the right bias from their ingroup experience with regards to outgroup traits, and second, they aren’t opposed to acting in accordance with that bias. Radical groups and radicalized individuals both base their actions in a foundation that justifies further othering of social minority groups, the designated outgroup, and act in ways that specifically negatively impact these people. Whether the perpetrators would still be physically or socially violent without this

ideology is unproven; however, there is no apparent relationship between the existence of marginalizing behavior and which specific outgroup is targeted over other available outgroup target. Methods differ, depending on actors and on cultural factors, but the act of violence doesn't appear to be limited to targeting one outgroup. Based on the ways caustic relations with subsets of the outgroup cluster—ie, an individual who is both racist and queerphobic is likely to also be antisemitic and islamophobic as well—and the willingness of that individual to vocally defame these social minorities, indicates that there is enough crossover between disjoint hate groups to analyze their general modes of behavior and methods without limiting the search to one subset of hate. This discussion, then, will be focussing on the spread of hateful violence perpetrated by socially empowered ingroups, organized rhetorical actions and disorganized guerilla attacks both; how an individual who previously shared an ingroup identity but not conscious outgroup discrimination against social minorities is taken into the fold, as well as the spread of new ideas and communication within an ingroup and among different hate groups.

As a component of the fear of the other that binds ingroups together, members of a hate group will make the argument that they themselves are truly social minorities, and oppressed in turn by the groups they target or blame in their worldview and ideology. I feel comfortable denying this identity to social majorities in my writing, and disregarding claims by hate group members that the ingroup represented in their favoritism is in fact a minority. A social minority holds the lesser share of power in a society, regardless of population sizes. Members of such an identity group will have shared experiences of being denied opportunities, verbally or physically attacked, or maliciously ignored by virtue of the identity they hold, and in a manner that is consistent with the historic

treatment of that group by the social majorities surrounding them. While it is true that minority identities, albeit shaped by majority actions, are defined by their members and so are the ways that identity impacts their lives and the oppressed define their own experience, reported acts of hatred and violence *are* attested to by outside sources. They will rarely be recorded or attested to in the same way as by the minority community, perhaps not even directly acknowledged, but someone unrelated to the events in question will be able to observe that they actually happened. Records that events occur, combined with an observation of damage by that third party together suggest what an oppressed group describes actually occurs. This is not a perfect metric, but if assuming a conclusion is correct is necessary to prove it, then it's most likely false.

The behaviors and tendencies outlined here are not the sum total of hate group rhetorical forms, nor the complete origin of any form of hate being propagated in the world right now. They are, however, necessary base concepts to establish prior to any further discussion. The privileged identity an organized hate group is founded on, in turn forms a hate group on its own, one whose members will participate in unawares. Membership in this implicit group can be worked against and modified to be less hateful, but the group itself remains a hate group when joined with the outgroup hostility Tajfel describes: a hostility which can be seen in nearly every presentation of ingroup/outgroup dynamics presented here. Even if it is simply present by favoring the ingroup when it comes to decision making, individual actions have a compound impact in generating hate.

Chapter 2: Offline | The Basics

Conveniently, the basics of ingroup and outgroup dynamics set people up for accepting overt declarations of hate without necessarily realizing it. Some people come to organized hate groups through rearing; they were born into it, or raised by people who held similar values, and so continue to hold those same values themselves, or adopt the ideology of one through similar exposure. In the offline environment, the recruitment phase relies on four core components: proximity, normalization, an experience of distress, and the promise of secret knowledge. The ratios of these components vary, but all are frequently present. The secret knowledge involved is often an open secret, embedded in the assumptions that build the outgroup discrimination and its "formative presence in American lives" (Hill, 2008, p. 47), normalized in language. Publically available discussion, from print materials to news broadcasts delivered by radio programs or cable television, relies on cultural idioms to communicate—and the culture disproportionately represented is that of the most dominant ingroups.

Most of the population would have had an average exposure to organized racial hatred in childhood, and only extremized later in life. This does not imply that values will always follow rearing, as there are plenty of children born to bigoted parents who choose to leave their family's tradition in favor of a less violent ideology. However, there is also a population of children of progressive families who join or spearhead hateful ingroups, such as James Jackson or Jason Kessler. In 2017, Jackson, coming from a family with a history of liberal and progressive thinking in the United States, traveled five hours from his home state of Maryland to New York City with the specific goal of killing Black men,

and proceeded to murder Timothy Caughman (Collman 2017). Kessler, in contrast, is not directly personally responsible for anyone's death, but organized and defended the deadly Unite the Right rally held in Charlottesville, Virginia (Bertrand, 2017); a year later, he inadvertently revealed that his family is incredibly outspoken against his views (Robinson, 2018). While these two individuals are better known than most raised to a hate group, who will become nameless faces in media coverage of an extremist rally or the like, Caughman and Kessler are only the clearest recent examples of adult children behaving drastically counter to their home communities' politics. The disparity between their actions and the values of their families indicate that the feeling of community inspired by hateful ingroups in combination with their ideologies can and will be valued over a family connections.

Normalization

It must be palatable to an individual to hate an outgroup and favor their ingroup for them to actively do so; this does not mean they are specifically comfortable being associated with their hate group, nor that they will call themselves by any hate specific label, but that participating is within the realm of acceptable or reasonable behavior *to them*, regardless of how members of the outgroup could describe it. Much of how we talk, and talk about privileged or offensive language in the United States, is rooted in anti-Black racism—a prototypical example for how othering behavior along ingroup and outgroup lines can function. From this, white Americans generally can learn through social osmosis that certain words are hateful and bad (Hill, 2008), and should not be used in public conversation, without being explicitly taught about certain combinations of

sounds. This lesson is learned even though these words are social taboo to say—regardless of personal beliefs on the matter. Despite the existence of differing relationships to the words themselves, when a white person in a position of power, social or legal and at any scale, uses a racial slur a conversation is started to determine if this person is in fact a racist or they made a mistake.

Setting aside a conversation on whether the two are somehow different, to be perceived of as a racist is considered a *bad thing*, because of a comfortable understanding that only bad people or stupid people are like that; Hill calls this the "folk theory of racism" (2008, p. 4), which in turn plays into unsavory outgroup depictions of racists as only being from the South, or uneducated, or both (p. 66). This makes the concept of being a racist synonymous with a hick or an otherwise socially undervalued white outgroup to the ingroup of seemingly progressive white society, and still favored over People of Color. In this case, the hate group is simply the surrounding society by virtue of prioritizing white comfort over the history and pain of slurs; so whether or not a person is a racist, or said a racist thing, is left up to a trial of their character, considering a "defense [which] focuses, not on the words, but on the speaker" (Hill, 2008, p. 88). This defence postulates that, since it was ostensibly so much worse in the past, exemplified in the folk understanding of "southern bigots conjur[ing] the past in order to valorize it," that the speaker existing in the present can't have acted with the same intensity that marginalized people respond to in these cases. Defenders of an individual call on the folk theory to "allay the feelings of guilt, confusion, or anxiety" that arise during these allegations (Berger, n.d.), and respond by assuring the speaker that their action was not, in fact, bigoted. Criticizing blatant hate speech, then, is perceived as an attack in the stead of the

violence in the word choice by the speaker. The fanfare around proving that the individual who allegedly misspoke moves focus away from why they said what they did in the first place; and fails to address the othering inherent to the English language. That this production of redirection is so pervasive in combination with the line of defence provided in Hill's folk theory of racism that, if anything, the othering is then further normalized. If it was defensible in one context, then people in similar positions to the speaker but unrelated to that conversation can cite as justification it in their own interactions.

Beyond plain language, the homogenized conceptions of outgroups by the ingroup are so regularly used in marketing that that image in turn supplants any actual behaviors or traits the outgroup might possess. A famous instance is the use of Black 'mammy' caricatures to market breakfast foods, the Aunt Jemima of Quaker Oats' intellectual property ("Aunt Jemima Home Page", n.d.). Established as a character in 1889, this design played on perceptions associated with mammies, as doting surrogate mother or grandmother figures to white households (Pilgrim, 2000), a figure who arguably never existed, but is a comfortable image for white Americans to displace guilt with. Aunt Jemima is portrayed as a typically stereotyped member of this class, appearing to delight in her work to provide white families with delicious baked goods, an allegedly free continuation of "pictured female household slaves as: fat, middle-aged, dark-skinned, undesirable . . . happy to serve whites, always smiling" (Doneghy, 2018). All of these traits are harmful stereotypes of Black women who were and still are perceived as embodying them by nature, where while women of color do make up a large percentage

of the service industry they are not there by choice or some inherent trait, rather what opportunities are available as a symptom of this perception (Kerby, 2012).

In a more generic instance, cultural identities and slurs are used in marketing products to white consumers regularly. What these products are don't need to have any relevance to the culture that is being used to brand them, but what is being sold is the *idea* of a culture as it exists in a romanticized image scrubbed clean of any inconvenient race relations. As of March 3rd, 2019, searching for sales listings including the word (uncensored) 'g*psy,' a slur against Romani returned 275,719 items on the small sellers market Etsy, and over 90,000 when run on Amazon (a more precise number could not be obtained due to the ordering of information and lack of disclosure on the part of the corporation on how their data is managed). It is unlikely that there are fewer listings on this platform than on the smaller non competitor serving a niche market, but it is possible from the way that the seller and listing information is handled behind the scenes that a more accurate number cannot currently be created; however, from artefacts of discussions in 2013 we can assume that this number was once readily available, according to a question posed and discussed by Amazon sellercentral users Electronic_Advantage, unique_app, and somethin who all describe this information as being available in the format "'Showing 1 - 24 of 20,468,001' Results." Conducting the same searches, replacing the keyword with 'native american,' returned 189,938 listings on Etsy, and over 100,000 on Amazon. These would not be the most populated buzzword used for instances of designs speaking to the stereotyped understanding of First Nations designs and practices, but there is no way to rule out which of the 535,419 listings on Etsy and over 600,000 on Amazon for 'indian' are referencing the outdated term for indigenous peoples

to the Americas, or to the culture in Asia. Strictly speaking, these are digital references, but they speak to a marketing ethos present in offline spaces that can be observed in brick and mortar stores and in old catalogues, which is simply easier to count when uploaded to the internet en masse.

Regardless, many of these listings are either blatantly disconnected from the culture they claim to describe, or impossible to determine the origins of. While some of them may be legitimate products being sold by and for Romani or First Nations sellers, the history of cultural appropriation and colonization speak for themselves, and each of the search keys used call to mind a sense to the American consumer of the idea of a culture that has been constructed by the ingroup, often one that doesn't call to mind any of the violent history between white Europeans and other cultures. Sellers of these products are not intentionally accessing racist slurs or caricatures to sell their products; they are operating in the landscape created by Search Engine Optimization (SEO), which refers to defining an internet presence by what people are likely to search that might be related to your product or service (Fishkin, 2015). An internet user looking to purchase something or learn more about it, is going to use the words they already know to try and find anything, and so sellers know that the cultural point of reference someone means when they type "g*psy fashion" or another derivative will contain either an image of their product, or something similar enough to be categorized that way. This also points to an established offline conception of that falsified cultural narrative, and how it is preserved for modern analytic methods to track. In trivializing the cultures used to sell these products, or in reinforcing the understanding of racial caricatures as factual, individuals

and organizations are feeding into the further normalization of outgroup othering in daily communication.

By further othering these outgroups as a commodity, irrespective of the history involved in that line of thinking, the apparent divide between a more powerful ingroup grows, and leads to ingroup members assuming that the caricatured behavior or images are actually representative of the outgroups. In turn, that perception leads to myths around People of Color feeling less pain or being physiologically different from whites (Somashekhar, 2016), like having an extra bone that makes them better at physical activities (Reference*, n.d.). Those concepts feed into the idea that Black people, and other social minorities, are overrepresented in physical labour fields or in other undervalued work because they are better suited to it which is, in turn, a racist belief.

Distress

Adopting hate ideology without an explicit background in it tends to come as an answer to some personal distress. Whether that distress is a car crash, economic downturn, or struggling amongst cliques in high school (Landes, 2002; Blee 2002; Faraj, n.d.), there must be some friction in someone's life to inspire change. This is already encoded in teaching about the Second World War; one of the widely accepted foundational social problems leading to the Nazi regime was the financial crisis precipitating the Great Depression when the loans of foreign wealth Weimar Germany was using to rebuild after the First World War were collected by the lenders (Faraj, n.d.). This put the citizens operating as members of the dominant ingroup in a position where they were easily swayed by an offer to end what ills they experienced, as provided by the

Nazi campaign promises. While this serves as a useful example for how a country as a whole reacts to stress, on an individual level there doesn't need to be a true nationwide catastrophe waiting to break.

While conducting in-depth life history interviews with female identifying members of known neo-Nazi, white nationalist, Christian identity, and skinhead organizations, Kathleen Blee (2002) found that, consistently, there was a time of struggle in the subject's life which they would relate to the rhetoric of their respective hate group. One subject, anonymized and referred to as Judy for convenience, was a known figure in an East Coast Aryan group, and had a particularly clear narrative around a tragic event that she claims lead to her activity in the hate group (Blee, 2002). After a divorce that left her and her children in dire financial straits, she moved their family to Cleveland, Ohio, and could only afford lodging in a much poorer neighborhood than they had lived in before. She described interactions with Black people in her neighborhood first as standoffish but neutral, where she largely ignored them and they largely ignored her. She began to perceive slights against her by neighbors in increasingly racialized terms, and began to blame the financial standing of the neighborhood on negative traits she assumed the Black residents possessed. As Judy's relationship to the region was increasingly racialized, she was struck in a hit and run car crash. This collision she personally cites as a turning point in her life, going from unable to describe the driver to determining that he was a Black man and this was a targeted attack rather than an accident (Blee, 2002). Blee notes that this interpretation "made sense of the financial and other hardships that she faced as a divorced mother with limited opportunities" (2002, p. 41), and while it is not externally verifiable it is treated consistently within Judy's description of her life.

Another stressor is evident in the story provided by Sarah, another of Blee's anonymized subjects. Sarah attended an underfunded middle and high school that served a mixed race population. She recounts feeling unsafe, and experiencing physical and verbal bullying at the hands of like-age Black students, though does not have as clear a moment as Judy to point to (Blee, 2002).

Both of these accounts involve synthesizing an experience of the past into a current understanding of an individual's racially motivated self. Blee suggests that further, these are "*learned* accounts, shaped retrospectively by mainstream cultural themes as well as by the political, ideological, and even stylistic conventions dominant in racist groups" (2002, p. 43). An order is suggested in what might otherwise be unrelated events without the causality that hate group rhetoric supports. This understanding takes a social norm, that there are challenges to be faced in life and hardship strikes as it wills, and twists it into a relationship where the selected outgroup is truly responsible for whatever befalls potential recruits into extremist ingroups, which takes away any potential accountability for their own actions and from the necessary understanding that sometimes bad things just happen.

Secret Knowledge

One of the earlier accounts of one of these points of distress being sublimated into the fault of a social minority, was the failure of the rapture at the end of the first millennium. Peasantry in what would become France, circa 1000 CE, murdered a large proportion of the Jewish population in the surrounding areas because the rapture failed to rapt (Landes, 2002). By refusing to convert to Christianity, the Jewish people were

thought to have prevented the second coming of Christ on time, in accordance with the Christian population's beliefs. The reality of the rapture, or other end-times events, is hotly debated but not confirmable without accepting the assumption that it is true, so it would be tempting to dismiss this stressor. However, that would disregard that it felt true for the peasantry, based on their response to it *not* happening, and thereby blaming the most convenient nearby target. This is a form of apocalyptic scapegoating, blaming a disaster on an unrelated social minority without external evidence, and an extreme form of the secret knowledge that hate groups thrive off of. Blee describes this experience in her informant's own words, calling Nazism "the truth that made sense" (2002, p. 37), and in how women described bringing their friends into the fold "by simply telling them the facts about world affairs" (p. 45).

As a species, humans like it when things make sense, and so promises of secret knowledge, of making it all make sense like Blee describes, are very appealing to hear when we are struggling to understand something. That said, people in positions of power afforded to them by social prejudice are often *over* sensitive to perceived supplantation by social minority individuals. In situations engineered for women to interact in a setting—a conversation, or a panel interview—in the amount indicated by their numerical presence, such as in a group of three equally qualified people with two men and one woman where all participants speak for one third of the time, the male participants and frequently male observers would report that the women had spoken the most, or too much (Holmes, 1998). Further, Hill points out that the experiences of white people of the "distrust and even hatred that many non-White Americans feel when they think of or interact with White Americans" (2008, p. ix) can *feel*, to the white object of this

subjective experience, like what we assume racism must be like. While Wikipedia is not a credible source for content, material maintained by the Wikimedia Foundation comes with an intensely scrutinized and diligently curated log of edits to preserve the integrity of the resource. Using this dating scheme, the concept Hill referred to in 2008 to as 'sometimes called racism,' falls under the label reverse racism, coined four years later as evidenced by the first appearance of its documentation on Wikipedia in 2012 (Reverse Racism: Revision History, 2019).

Hill, along with most other scholars, dismisses this as an act of prejudice, because it is a one-off act by an individual, and not supported by a systemic force that can be proven externally. Further, a white person in America is statistically well situated to avoid situations that bring up these feelings, like avoiding an integrated or Black neighborhood or shopping only at luxury grocery stores, at little to no cost. The same option does not exist for a Person of Color. "Should a person of color [sic] choose to avoid all of the environments where she is likely to be hurt emotionally or even physically, the costs would be devastating, since these environments — the admissions office of a school, the reading room of a library, the human resources department of a corporation, the aisles of a discount store, the sidewalks of a neighborhood — will include nearly all of the sites where significant symbolic and material resources are distributed in our society" (Hill, 2008, p. ix). Allowing for that, that the information is available to counter something does not mean that it is widely accepted by everyone who might need to hear it. The promise of secret knowledge often comes through as a validation of that experience, of so called "reverse racism" or "white genocide" (Klan, n.d.) reported by extremist groups. The idea that this experience is comparable or

somehow more valid than that of People of Color and other social minorities, in combination with the sense that when those same minorities are more visible than the previous norm—allowing that this is nowhere close to proportionately representative of how many people there actually are—there is a way to tell a story that straight white Protestants in America are being wiped out. A story that is predicated on the notion that not only does might make right, but white makes right. The secret knowledge can either be, then, that the so-called white genocide is taking place, or the true superiority of the ingroup.

As with delusions of persecution, secret knowledge regarding racial superiority is also available both as extremist rhetoric and in common thinking. Historically this can be observed in early debates around Darwinian evolution, which co-occurred with other early racial science that has largely been debunked by the scientific community. Despite concessions by Charles Darwin himself, and other researchers, that the fundamental similarities between members of different races and ethnic groups indicate a shared species (Keel, 2018, p. 85), the idea still persisted in popular science that the white race was a species unto itself and superior to all others. The US Public Health Service—which later grew into the National Institutes of Health—readily adopted eugenic hypotheses that different races, ethnicities, and cultural backgrounds came with innately different health standards and needs, alleging that any racial grouping *other* than recent roots in Europe would be of poorer moral character than white counterparts, have different diseases (Keel, 2018, p. 91), and would similarly be less cognitively impacted by physical damage (Somashekhar, 2016). This ties in to the false notion that race alone contributes to intelligence and suitability to physical or cerebral pursuits, which then can be taken as

evidence that, if a society values intellect and social advances, then the empowered ingroup is superior to all others by virtue of being innately better at these tasks. That none of this is substantiated by research that doesn't assume the conclusion is beside the point.

Location, Location, Location

The final and frequently most pivotal requirement for offline recruiting is quite simply the literal physical proximity of a hate group open to new members. Blee's subjects recount being brought into the fold by friends, or bringing local friends into the fold in kind (2002, p. 45). It follows that having access to as yet unrecruited people would be a necessary component to recruit further members, as it is harder for a group or individual to spread rhetoric to a population they can't communicate with directly. As important as the three other factors discussed in this chapter are, they all rely on basic access to new members. The initial distress requires a community or individual to contextualize it in terms of the ingroup/outgroup conflict, and to catalyze this into a persistent way of thinking. Providing secret knowledge only works if it references cultural information that the recipient can make sense of, which in turn is aided if the source of this knowledge shares a similar social context with the recipient for the process of integrating it with the recipient's worldview. Normalization of an idea or concept is dependent on members of the community in which it occurs to share the standardized view amongst each other, which requires community interactions, which in turn requires access to other members of the community. Offline, all of these things require shared physical space to either establish or remain in contact in order to spread information. The

philosophy embedded in a dialect can only be transmitted to people who share a similar background and context for any new information.

Chapter 3: Uploading | 45%

Digital communication and online interactions are fundamentally different from offline, changing the rate of communication itself along with standards around confidentiality. In the offline world, the relationship of knowing someone comes with certain assumptions, that you possess information about them and their life, such as their name or their age or gender, all of which we use not only to establish social closeness but also to demark one individual from another. Conversations registers in an offline space come with an understanding that something is either personal, between specifically the speaker and the listener, or impersonal, in some other combination. When having a spoken conversation with one other person, such as in a private residence, one is likely to treat it as communication between two individuals, with a one-to-one relationship between speakers and listeners. This one-to-one pattern does not exist in every offline context, such as in public speaking, advertisements, rhetorical pamphlets, and so forth. The contents of a communication from the speaker in these situations will not specifically address the individual receiving it except by happenstance, regardless of whether or not the recipient knows anything of the speaker in return. In becoming a relationship between one source and multiple potential recipients, the communication has a one-to-many relationship from source to recipient; one piece of information is disseminated not specifically to the recipient, but addressed to them because of some observable or predictable general information about them (such as their physical location or the contents of their shopping cart) at some processing delay.

These two relationships, and the conversational registers (stylistic variations based on social context, audience, and personal background and identity) they imply, are blended once applied to an online interaction. One-to-many sources will still be addressing a collective, but more information about the recipients is available; from what communication platform is being used—like social media or email or instant messaging facilitated by a webservice—to what physical object they are using to interact this way—computer, cell phone, etc.— along with its readily available hardware specifications, and what it reports with respect to the user's physical location on earth. While this information seem trivial, in that offline advertisement could rationalize the same thing for targeting recently bankrupt households for auto loans in the 1980s (Long, 2014; Subprime Dealer Services, n.d.), the speaker in these online interactions will often use the more personal register. They'll employ second-person language, use slang, and otherwise write messages as though they are to a peer.

Further, which biographical information an individual human can gather to make decisions about others is not necessarily brought into a digital world. Currently, there is a push on social media to associate your offline identity fully with your online presentation, up to and including requiring individuals to provide accurate biographical information as a part of the terms of use (Facebook, 2005). Previously, and currently on other platforms less dedicated to mirroring offline norms, online personas were comparable to the person behind them as much or as little as that individual presented their true biographical information. Someone's presentation of themself online frequently did share many biographical features as their identity in real life, but there was no way to verify with certainty that the personal information they provided was true beyond a reasonable doubt.

This doesn't mean all information someone provided through this lens was false, nor that it should be accepted without question. Personal trust, and observation and experience of someone's behavior, was used instead to generate a concept of others' trustworthiness and personhood in lieu of the same offline cues. There will still be markers in a person's communication style or relationship to their demonstrated self concept that indicate their various offline identities—such as gender, race, and age—which can give an *idea* of what they present themselves like in an offline space, but the poster could still be intentionally mimicking those features endemic to a different background. As a concept, masking this way isn't new. Stage acting and taking on the persona of a different person has been around for a very long time, but it wasn't until recently that the selected presentation someone uses online was treated as an extension of the self. Normalized through mainstream websites such as Facebook, which require that users maintain such a connection between their off- and online selves, the assumed lack of such a connection somehow lets treatment of that generated persona be ignored or dismissed as unreal because it lacked personal offline data, thereby also lacking a personal connection to the creator and user of that persona under the offline model.

Agents outside of the early internet subcultures treated this partial anonymity as less real than offline behavior, or assumed that threats made in an online and anonymous context held no true danger. This is part of what invited intentionally hateful acts into cyberspace. When Blee was conducting her own research in the mid-nineties, her efforts were hamstrung by a partial digital relocation: as the racist community was already becoming less centralized in response to heightened criticism following a high-profile 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City (FBI, n.d.),

groups and individuals often opted for what they called “leaderless resistance” instead (Blee, 2002, p. 15).

In a take on warfare and conflict known as guerrilla strategy, leaderless resistance shrank organizations from large operations to cells of a small handful of group members or even individuals acting alone. Operating in this way was facilitated by a platform for communication to a larger audience, unlimited by funding restrictions and without requiring resources like a venue to speak from or to organize in, or the paper and ink needed to produce flyers. The platform was the fledgeling internet. This anonymity and decentralization impacted investigations into criminal actions by removing the possibility of a single location being searched or raided under warrant, and made operations safer for individual and small cells of radicalized ingroup members by giving the option to remain anonymous to each other and to the whole ingroup at large. This, in turn, helped prevent exposure by undercover outgroup members. The early capacity for anonymity is still available to a lesser degree, but was far more readily available to the public in the 1990s and early 2000s, as tracking an individual’s internet presence was time consuming and typically not worth the resources for a layman to attempt. Operating online in this way, hate group members could operate effectively and anonymously: “[w]hile adhering to a common agenda of Aryan supremacism, they were able to develop their own strategies, even select enemies, without answering to formal leaders” (Blee, 2002, p. 15). For much the same reason that this strategy was implemented to avoid prosecution, it impacted Blee’s ability to study the population of women in organized hate, and put her safety at further risk. She attributes this change to the shift to leaderless resistance, stating that “[it] makes studying the racist movement scarier because it reduces the accountability of

individual racists" (2002, p. 15). Blee demonstrates this through an example of when she would attend racist rallies, with the permission of a rally's leader. Earlier in her investigation, this would have assured her safety, as the rally attendees would have been members of, if not the same hate group, at least allied ones. Following this decentralization, the alliance between individuals in attendance became built out of a shared ingroup preference and presumable outgroup discrimination, instead of a communally agreed upon form of conduct.

Next Door Neighbors a World Away

Personhood is preserved across locations and communities, offline, as well as in digital spaces. This comes with not only a sense of self, but also the biases carried when interacting with other people. Outside of the communities which immediately and completely embraced the potentials of online communication, who started to forge social norms for interacting with different personal information as outlined above, laymen did not as readily accept a string of numbers and letters as of equivalent value to an offline acquaintance. Whether they considered these individuals and subsequent relationships entirely fabricated, or less real than a true face-to-face relationship, or felt that there was a complete severance between the online presence and the offline self, was largely a matter of fluency in the medium and personal status in social power structures: i.e., a person who regularly experienced privilege offline would likely detect no difference in how people treated him online if he does not modulate his behavior. This lead to the illusion that all comers, of every background imaginable, are somehow equally heard on the internet.

In 1990, Mark Poster described this from a perspective of privilege, claiming that "computer conferences upset the power relations, both economic and endered, that govern [face-to-face] speech. Factors such as institutional status, personal charisma, rhetorical skills, gender, and race … have little effect in computer conferences" (p. 122-123). While it is true, that these factors were not readily or consciously available in situations of the '90s web, Poster inadvertently relates the experience of his own place in the social order as universal. Earlier in the same text, he recognized digital media as being capable of "mixing audiences normally kept separate in the course of daily life" (1990, p. 44), which is part of the sound foundation of his idealized commentary on social mixing online. That said, the content of Poster's report is inconsistent with the theory of ingroup and outgroup dynamics, though the way he relates his own experience becomes an example of them.

The understanding that marginalized as well as privileged identities have no bearing in anonymized spaces is easy to come to if one has never had the need to code switch based on group identity. Code-switching is a regular feature of language and communication, where a speaker changes word choice and sentence structure in different situations based on audience, subject matter, or their surroundings. While a person in a privileged ingroup may want to switch to an outgroup's register, and attempt to do so, if they choose not to switch that will be respected whereas a member of that less favored outgroup won't be (Hult, 2014). However, members of social minorities will not have had a similar experience, and must be accustomed to code-switching as a necessity if they want to be listened to instead of dismissed based on outgroup discrimination (Blay, 2015). The illusion that code-switching doesn't take place online can be broken anywhere

from unsolicited style notes on word choice and spelling—away from dialectical speech and towards 'standard' English—to the process of culture sharing and dialect cross pollination possible on social media, as origins of slang get overwritten and attributed to more desirable outgroups.

A case where this is particularly noticeable is the adoption of words previously unique to African American Vernacular English (AAVE) by whites and other People of Color. Terms like *fleek*, a vague notion of being well presented, *bae*, referring roughly to a significant other, and *squad*, to describe a group of close friends or a group who does things together (Blay, 2015) all originated in Black communities, as budding components of an AAVE informed by digital platforms. These terms have found their way more or less into the white mainstream, along differing narratives: *fleek* and *squad* are alleged to have emerged from the gay community as Black gay men used them around non-Black gay men who associated the terms as gay slang rather than a queer dialect of AAVE (Collazo, 2016), and *bae* has been falsely attributed as an acronym for "Before Anyone Else" (Blay, 2015) in an effort to distance it from AAVE linguistic features. Even then, as regular use of these terms rises, they're still infantilized, and treated as a fad amongst youth who will grow out of what is seen as immature speech (Brookes, 2015). Brookes points out that, while these words have been overwritten as internet-speak and a passing phase among kids, their origin in AAVE is completely ignored and yet still further devalued when they come from Black mouths. This isn't particularly different from offline behavior, where privileged populations incorporate components from outgroups' cultures without critical analysis, but much like code switching it's not something members of empowered ingroups will regularly notice without being alerted to.

Similarly, coded language to disguise prejudice has existed even before the information age, informed by the mediums available, and could be an open secret among a hate group and unintelligible to members of a shared ingroup without being brought into the loop. With the advent of online spaces, there are “new structures of information, [which] treated as linguistic phenomena, introduce changes in the pattern of communication in society” (Poster, 1990, p. 28). Coded language to refer to members of outgroups, or refer to concepts within the secret knowledge of a particular doctrine, will often specifically require understanding some of that secret knowledge. Terms of this nature are called ‘dog whistles’, in reference to a high pitched tone that is inaudible to the general public. Names of applications and corporations substituted in place of collective words for a social minority have been cropping up online (Tingle, 2016) to avoid detection as a part of the leaderless resistance paradigm. Authors reporting on them will say that these dog whistles exist, but they generally won’t bring up why. For example the triple parentheses around someone’s name, i.e. (((John Smith))), indicates that the referenced person is Jewish (“Echo”, n.d.). This particular symbol came out of an alt-right podcast in 2014 (Hess, 2016), referencing a foundational myth accredited to *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* that there are echoes through history of Jewish actions, indicating Jewish control of world affairs (Fleishman & Smith, 2016). There isn't a complete model for this behavior offline, since typically word of mouth doesn’t come with punctuation, and so similarly there is no direct analog equivalent. Compare this to online, where a conversation between two people then becomes a matter of public record. A reader now has access to all of the things said and done online that before, in an offline

context, only would have been available in a one-to-many publication such as a leaflet, a brochure, or a newspaper.

Moments Frozen in Time

There is an adage pertaining to digital communication: “the internet is forever.” Variations on this exist, but all get at the same basic meaning: as soon as you make something publically available, you have no real control over who gets to see it or how long it lasts. This means retracted statements still float around cyberspace to be quoted, but more than that, even if something *is* taken down from a website, unlisted from its host service, or the like, it’s entirely possible that another entity has saved a copy and so it can still circulate. This is not to say that everything lasts forever online, as one single piece of data from an individual is less likely to be preserved, but information rarely truly dies. Compare this to a five-card hand dealt in a game of poker: the chances that the specific combination that matters to someone has been dealt are incredibly low, however there is a 100% chance that someone has been dealt five of the 52 cards.

Public information, put out by a group or an individual with enough social clout and popularity that an unknown minimum number of visitors load their web page repeatedly, will be recorded in one of several ways. A website is a fancy way of dressing up a list of files, typically comprised of a list of what things to put where on the screen of the reading device, and a description for the web browser—called a style sheet—of what it should look like. These instructions will include references to other files, either to display inside of a webpage or to be navigated to (i.e., a photo of the subject matter, or instructions on how to access another location in cyberspace). The act of opening a

webpage involves your computer loading into its memory the files that are referenced, and arranging them according to the style sheet and the skeleton laid out. One of these referenced files can be saved from where the web browser has temporarily put it, to a personal computer.

The entire webpage can be saved this way, instead of being allowed to disappear once the web browser is told it doesn't need to hold onto it anymore. There are ways to include information for the web browser, say to only let someone look at the file in the web browser and not save a copy of it, but these are a lot like writing a name on something in an office fridge: it only stops people who would stop if you asked them to in person. Even without those protections, someone can change the type of information presented in a way that can be saved far easier, so much so that this method is often preferred on social media: take a picture of the screen. This can be with an external camera or recording device, of course, but more often refers to taking a screenshot. Screenshots differ from just downloading the information in that, instead of taking a file that already exists and duplicating it, the user sends a command to the computer to take down the exact order and colors of pixels lit up on the screen—the computer doesn't care if some of them are words and some of them are pictures and some of them are just empty space, they will all get written down the way it was last told to put them, and this new list file can be accessed at any time by the user, who will see an image.

Based on this convenience, sharing content using duplicate records like this is incredibly popular—however, none of these methods inherently preserve information about where the file came from, who made it, or who posted it. This information exists within the files a lot of the time, but can be manually edited and, in an easier method of

achieving the same goal, a screenshot can be taken or a new file written that specifically *doesn't* encode that information, or encodes different data about the content. A response to this, and to digital information preservation in general, is the Wayback Machine. The Wayback Machine is a tool designed by the nonprofit Internet Archive, which helps build a digital library of "Internet sites and other cultural artifacts" (About IA, n.d.). While the adage referenced earlier is usually quoted about potential sources of embarrassment, there are plenty of serious reasons to be concerned with data backups, from fact checking claims to preserving content after the platform that hosted it is no longer available, which are the Internet Archive's primary concerns. The existence of tools like this digital library, as well as manually saving this information independently, are vital to being able to describe the landscape of the early internet just as it was entering common use by the general public and as hate groups became an established feature of this landscape.

The staying power of online information applies to *all* online content, not only the things typically classed as public information. Everything from chat logs, to conversations in response to a piece of media, to certain examples of email and social media presences are preserved, along with long-form articles, news information, and entertainment or informative media programming. Combining this with the initial anonymity that online spaces provide—that, within reason, you can define yourself to be however you choose and other users will largely take that at face value—it is extremely simple to construct sock puppet impressions of internet users to act in any rhetorically convenient fashion. They can be used as straw men or as nameless supporters to pad a bandwagon. While there was plenty of directly transferred hate material as the move online was being completed, and plenty of verifiable ingroup members who were exactly

who and what they claimed to be, the ability to tailor information to a target once, and have it applied repeatedly without further effort, was readily embraced.

Take, for instance, the Stormfront organization, which first appeared on the web in 1995 or 1996 (sources vary) (Daniels, 2009; "Stormfront", n.d.). The site initially appeared as a resource page providing articles and uplifting messages for "those courageous men and women fighting to preserve their White Western culture, ideals and freedom of speech and association – a forum for planning strategies and forming political and social groups to ensure victory" (Black, 1996). Based on Don Black's previously visible public life and his later public recognition of his ownership of the website and founding its early maintenance, it seems he most likely *is* the original founder, and owner of the archive. However, appearing as early as April 1999 until between May 12th and May 14th, 2005, the subdomain at url *http://kids.stormfront.org/* held some of the same rhetoric as its parent site at *http://www.stormfront.org/*, albeit watered down and targeted at grade- and middle-school-aged minors.

The landing page declared White Pride For Kids' [sic] a personal website of an eleven-year-old named Derek. Derek is implied to be related to the founder of Stormfront through the shared surname, and there is real-world evidence that Don Black has a son named Derek, who was at one point active in the Stormfront organization (Black, 2010). The presentation of the data is outdated by today's standards, but follows the established norms of the era (Kelly, 2013), with a pixelated repeating background, large text, low resolution flashing or transforming images, and text lighter than the background trays it was displayed in front of, complete with floating word art. It seems unlikely that the claimed creator actually made the site himself, given the quality of some of the code that

survived being archived and is still functional nearly twenty years later; most likely, as a subdomain of stormfront.org, content might be loosely based on what the actual child Derek had said, but is largely the creation of his father. The maturity of the word choice in the introductory blurb follows rhetoric and word choices of an adult rather than a ten year old, but occasionally dips into a younger and less formal register while being consistent content-wise, suggesting that it is written by an adult partially code-switching to the dialect of a child. The text from the first available capture of the site to the last before it was taken down shows little to no evolution in writing skill, which is unexpected for a pre-teen. Further, it seems unlikely that there existed a ten year old with the confidence in themselves and their writing to leave the same message up, unchanged, except for incrementing their age every year and only one small gramatical edit, as highlighted in Figure 1.

Regardless of the author, the content of this website closely mirrors current rhetorical strategies being used by leaderless and organized hate groups online; even though it is almost twenty years old, most of the language and techniques used haven't changed. White Pride For Kids', and sites like it that have remained online, can be checked repeatedly, and cited repeatedly by other recruiters, and lead to a sense that there are more sources than there actually are. That the unsubstantiated claims made to appeal to distressed individuals, to appeal to a hunger for secret knowledge, are shared by a larger portion of their peers (such that peer pressure is applied to participate in hate this way) adequately pads the bandwagon to inflate a perceived number of members at large. An editorial article titled "Democrats have become the party of haters" (Miller, 2018) was posted at least nineteen years since White Pride For Kids' thinkpiece on "The Big

Bans", but shares methods and emotional pleas with the alleged work of a ten year old in the late '90s—such that if someone *wasn't* provided temporal information about the two, and current events were censored for recognizable dates and names, the pieces might as well be contemporaries, which can further inflate the perceived population of the ingroup. While there may have been, throughout the history of the web, as many active hategroup members as there are currently accessible relics of their content, the appearance that there have always been and currently are that many humans participating in hate rhetoric is a dangerous message to send, further normalizing hate action and artificially inflating an already too high sense of anxiety and dread amongst members of social minorities.

My Very Best Friend, And Yours Too, And Yours Too

It's not uncommon for a conversation, comment, or personal article to be shared around without the context of when it was written. A combination of partial anonymity and the shrinking of perceived distance between any two internet-capable people, combined with the longevity of these messages (in that they won't disappear of their own accord or through natural processes as an analog recording would),is that a very personal plea can be repeated again and again and again. In a page on a personal website, a blog post, or a statement on a more conversational social media platform, the recipient is not always known, as with any offline publication. Where there exist style guides for newspapers, magazines, and television broadcasts, the combination of little-to-no regulation in early digital media and the initial regional limits on online communication meant that other actors online were likely communicating to peers, conversational norms were an act of social consensus constructed much like regional dialects. The standard

drifted to anywhere from amicable to hostile, without any quality control serving as barriers to entry. When it came to rhetorical pieces, with the intent to change a mind or draw out allies in any context, word choice and sentence structure were often over-personal. This lent a sense of false closeness between the speaker and recipient; instead of making sweeping statements about morality or ethics pleas were written asking you, personally, to evaluate your position. The rhetoric wasn't inherently successful, this way, just as in an offline setting no amount of fake camaraderie and false closeness can replace a poorly structured argument, but freely posting it as an individual *to* an individual still comes across as more personal.

For instance, this can be seen in the collection of short editorials present on the White Pride For Kids' site, especially in Figure 2, "The Many Bans." This is a list with a watered down version of the same secret knowledge that would be fed to an adult audience, but still execute this form of closeless well. A reader in the target age range in 1999, the year it was published, would feel spoken to directly and *personally* connected to the content and the speaker. The bans list is an early permutation of anti-political correctness messages, and reads somewhere between a beat poem and prose. It starts by building camaraderie with the reader, describing an instance where a public safety issue led to a leisure activity—fireworks during early July, during a drought when fire risks were elevated—being disallowed. The author then insists that "they are trying to ban almost everything fun for kids," followed by a list of things with inane justifications.

It is not stated who 'they' are that are seeking to limit children's play, but it is strongly implied to be the same groups generally alleged to be threatening the white race. The reasons and activities listed include "Back-Yard Swimming Pools - (a kid could get

in and accidentally drown) ... Wading Pools - (a four-month-old could walk to it, climb in, and drown),” “Biking - (when you are learning how to ride, you could crash and brake [sic] your leg),” and ending with “Fireworks – (some one [sic] could go blind from a spark landing in there eye).” This is a feature in a commonly used rhetorical strategy to discredit dissenters and members of an outgroup who disagree. Starting with a premise created by the selected other, a false equivalence is generated between the premise and some deliberately absurd unrelated claims. In this case, the premise is banning fireworks, which is paralleled to other hypothetical bans with nonsensical reasons. While it is technically true that any one of the consequences described could happen, these tend to be considered an acceptable risk; in fencing or kickboxing, it’s understood that a result of the activity could be unintentionally injuring someone involved. Further, some of the examples are already banned, situationally, as with the fireworks that the page is predicated on. “Starting A Fire When You Are Camping” and snowboarding are both recreational activities in which it is normal operating procedure to limit participation with respect to the risks that they’re associated with. Ski resorts regularly close regions at higher risk for avalanches (Safety in the Sölden ski area, n.d.), and the forest service in the United States posts the threat level for fire in a region which comes with directives to not light fires at all at certain times. The writer of “The Big Bans,” though, is treating these limitations as absurd, and not reason enough to put a conditional ban on an activity. This tactic reduces the naysayer’s credibility by making their premise seem as absurd as the hypothetical cases, and further does so by finally taking the premise and redefining it so it follows the same pattern. The writer behind White Pride For Kids’ has done this with the fireworks advisory, defining it first at the beginning of the piece in the context

that it originally was made, where the concern was in fact wildfire risks (Times Wire Reports, 1998); and then defining it again at the end, as being actually related to the slim chance a stray spark could blind a child. This case doesn't arise in the original context the opposition provided it in, and it is important to note that none of the hypothetically equivalent cases are actually being suggested by the same city government. By the end of the piece, the reader is meant to have started with information that is acceptable to the uninformed, and members of the outgroup, that they may have thought of as reasonable, and then are shown a path of reasonable things to agree with until it's necessary to agree with information that is acceptable to the writer as well.

This tactic is slightly more subtle when played for an intended audience of adults, such as in a think piece published in July of 2018 in the *Chicago Tribune*, regarding the morality of political liberals. Author Desiree Miller starts with the premise that Democrats have called for action to condemn the current administration in the public and private sector, generalized from her opening statements listing instances of prominent speakers speaking against continued popular support for the president. She then goes on to ask inciting questions, demanding to know whether "this [is] what the Democratic Party has become? A party of haters? Do Democrats condone this behavior?" before commenting that she hasn't observed any condemnation on the part of official representatives or laypersons, and answering these hypotheticals with more selected quotes from figure heads. The premise is then laid out to share the qualities she demands and later demonstrates, such as being based in ridicule and malice. The redefinition phase is less concrete than in the Bans example, being most clearly seen in the question, "[t]he party of personal attacks and perpetual lies?" (Miller, 2018), accusing the Democrats of

being a party of personal attacks and perpetual lies. The premise Miller is attacking is personal action in response to a figurehead of a greater issue, i.e. a restaurant denying service to someone employed by the Trump administration (Selk, 2018). Then, the author limits the issue to that figurehead in their selection of supporting evidence, as well as insisting that the methods used by the figurehead are the same as what has been seen from the opposition. In the passage, "So we have Donald Trump, a true fighter. He has taken off the gloves and applied the very same fighting style against our opponents" (Miller, 2018), the author redefines the premise as Democrat leaders calling for people to condemn the figurehead personally, as well as to forward misinformation. Sidestepping the factual content of either Miller's or Black's work, this strategy relies on a degree of kinship and rapport with the reader; they must agree to something in the initial paragraphs, or identify in some manner with their conception of the author. More recently, on places like Twitter or other short-form conversation platforms, the same sort of conversation can be had in real time, and linked back to as supporting evidence.

The evolution into social media, where individuals don't need to be supported by their own access to a hosting service or bylaws of a larger publisher, is rooted in listservs and intentional subscription to updates from a publishing entity. A listserv is a method of sending out an email to a large group by sending content to a single address, which passes on the message to everyone on the list of recipient email addresses. Before the automated sharing of email addresses, the primary purpose of a listserv was to get messages that, for whatever reason, one had opted into receiving. This is not dissimilar to offline mailing lists, where a physical address is provided instead, but as the technology improves the content of these messages can still be personalised for each recipient—

typically seen in the form of an automated response structured with a salutation, and then the closest thing the connected database has to a legal first name, before jumping into the content.

This differs, though, from mass advertising from an automotive dealer or a state lottery with current residential information. There isn't a lot of regulation around how electronic mail can or can't be sent, and what it can or can't contain, and since it's free to use (albeit requiring a buy in of access to a computer, the internet, and a credential for an email handling services), email is received and sent more often than traditional mail. This leads to personal emails being less formal than personal letters would be, containing anything from an earnest description of the recent harvest to asking someone to pick up eggs from the market, and lowering the expectation for professionalism by any larger group distributing the content. Previously, rhetorical pamphlets would have to be passed out in person, distributed physically in a region, or mailed en masse to pre-collected addresses with postage paid. With this new method of access, organizations can reach masses of potential recruits to their ideology at once; as Prager University (PragerU) openly acknowledges doing.

PragerU is a nonprofit repository of informational videos and articles espousing the benefits of maintaining the status quo and all current levels of ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination. In addition, they have a listserv to push regular updates on their content, and a subgroup called PragerFORCE which expressly terms itself "the most influential digital army of conservative students that is fighting the Left on the newest and largest battlefield in the War of Ideas: social and digital media" (PragerU, n.d.). While the majority of their content will be treated in the following pages, their email

content is in keeping with the methods described above— personal, takes on the conspiratorial tone of a speaker that knows their listeners are also in the know on the secret knowledge, while still managing to offer insights into the world as they see it: “Do you care about the race of your doctor, or the gender of the person who built the bridge you drive across? The latest trend across STEM fields claims you should. Heather Mac Donald … explains where these destructive ideas are coming from” (info@prageru.com, 2019). These emails are informal, akin to pamphlets distributed at offline hate group events, with none of the inconvenience of needing to be more than five feet from a personal computer and five years from its invention; all written by someone who doesn’t know you, but wants to seem like they could.

Chapter 4: Online | What Changes

In online spaces, more information is shared about an individual than would be offline, leading to new trends in recruitment. The new information—metadata, or data about data—isn't processed the same way that would be intuitive to a human who hasn't been familiarized with digital data collection. What a web browser, or other internet-connected program, tends to know includes both the files that make the webpage it's looking at, as well as what sort of computing device it's sitting inside of, the very basics of the internet connection it's connected to so it can get new files when the ones it has run out or the user wants to go somewhere else, and which person is currently authorized to use it. All this information is used to make functioning online more convenient for the end user, since their own device and materials will remember them, but is also used behind the scenes to tailor the online experience to be what is more likely to appeal to an individual based on that information—regardless of their personal tastes. The algorithms used for this are often incredibly effective, comparing what user information comes with an online presence along with what they have looked at online recently to predict what someone will want to see next. Convenience and the potential cool factor of new technology were pushed forward without understanding potential consequences; this was understandable since nothing quite like it had been tested on a large pool of subjects prior, and once it was released into the wild of cyberspace there's no taking it back. Unfortunately, the consequences included intensifying and reinforcing ingroup bias and making it even easier to overshadow any media that disagrees with the proposed secret knowledge—the traditional information shared offline, and newly minted rhetoric both.

Crowdsourcing Bias

The way the metadata and user session info (whose credentials are being used, what is the address to relay responses to so the user can see it, and the like) is converted into recommendations is multifaceted. The fundamental information exchanged is standardized to a degree to make communication possible, but also to make it easier for new developers to add on their own projects. In 1997, the Resource Description Framework (RDF) was provided as a standard by the World Wide Web Consortium, acting as a work-in-progress to start from for future development. RDF was never meant to be a final product, much like HyperText Markup Language (HTML) and other standards for digital communication; these sets of rules are meant to be developed further as the use of the technology evolves (Schloss & Miller, 1997). In the case of RDS it evolved into RSS (Rich Site Summary or Really Simple Syndication), one of various methods for someone to see all new content and changes for a website that has implemented an RSS feed. For convenience sake, and to make a lot of newer technologies work correctly, some of these tags are stored inside your web browser; like which accounts you are authorized to use at the moment, what websites you have already been to in this session, or what websites have been visited by this copy of the web browser. These tags are also how an individual sharing information online and a search engine would be able to find online content in the first place; however a single human and a search engine would have very different methods of organizing the information they find.

The same data that is standardized—like how to describe the owner of a webpage, what it's called or how to title it, whether or not something is a link—for simple

programs to use and for humans to read are readily accessible to more advanced algorithms. A search engine doesn't just go through a list somewhere of every public web page and send back the ones that contain the search terms in the order it finds them, nor does it strike out into cyberspace and come back with whatever instances of the searched items it can find as a frontiersman would. There is a phrase, the 'indexed web,' which refers to the parts of the public internet sites that are linked to by another website, which in turn a search engine has access to and has noted down the location and content of the linked pages. Where it saves the information that something exists, what links to it, and what it links to, is the 'index' of the indexed web, which is what is searched when one enters a query into a search engine. So, for something to be recommended in the first place, the recommender has to know about it, so it needs to be available on the indexed web. Even within that index, though, the first things shown to a user are not the first things found in the index; they're sorted by relevance. While not described as recommendations, these entries are the search engine's recommended locations for you to look at what you searched for, ranked from most to least likely to be useful for what it extrapolates you were probably looking for—more on this mechanism to follow.

The process of creating overly complicated sorting and thing-finding programs has been largely handed over the field of machine learning, which is in essence straining a lot of linear algebra through some data until the math that's collected in the sink is good at making what you want; and the methods that are the simplest to explain and most widely used are called supervised learning and unsupervised learning. In supervised learning, a program has been written to make more programs that guess in different ways based on a specific problem with a correct answer, and a program has been written that

takes a set of test questions with binary answers, like yes/no or true/false, that only it knows. The smaller programs are sent to the testing program, who reports back to the creator program which of the algorithms did the best on the tests. The creator program takes the better algorithms that, while still not good at whatever job they're being made for, are better than the others were, and makes another set of algorithms based on them but with some parts changed to see if that makes a difference. These new algorithms are sent to the testing program, who performs the same action; this process is repeated at least until an algorithm that is good enough at the task emerges. At that point, the algorithm is implemented for whatever job it was designed for, and the creator/tester programs may either be switched off or continue to try for a better algorithm than the one that was deemed successful enough to be used (CGP Grey, 2017). Unsupervised learning is similar, except the creator program doesn't start with an example of what the algorithms it makes *should* be able to solve, and the tester doesn't have nearly as easy a time telling if the algorithms did well or not. Unsupervised learning is better for making algorithms that can make different classifications of information, and classify information as outside the things it already knows about; whereas a supervised algorithm will try to answer about everything it sees as one of its two categories. What someone is actually shown, by one of these algorithms that's been grown to sort recommended links full of content, is a combination of both of these types of training to produce one or more algorithms working together to show you what people most likely want based on what you said, and what people *like you* usually mean when they type the same thing.

On content-based websites, like social media or big name video hosting services, the information stored about you in your web browser, like who you are and if you have

an account with them and what other things you've looked at recently, is fed to the algorithms inside of those platforms. From your authentication, if you have one, the algorithm behind the search field is able to categorize you with all the things that you've already done on that platform while logged in or are otherwise identifiable. With and without authentication, there are scripts that are used to see where your web browser has recently visited, which are also data taken into account. When a user searches for something, or when they look at a landing or homepage on a website that isn't in chronological order, what they are shown is a combination of what all users overall have looked at the most, and what users with similar data as the current searcher will have interacted with (CGP Grey, 2017). Different platforms will have designed their algorithms around different goals, like whether someone is likely to share something they see or whether they're likely to look at it for longer, but all orient around catering to the searching user in some way. The more people like the user responded in the way the algorithm has been trained to look for something, the more likely the user is to respond that way, which is in turn profitable for the designers of the algorithm. This means, that the things a user is shown when they use a content sharing website are more likely to have already been seen by other people, or are sufficiently similar to things that have already been interacted with in the way the algorithm is trained to look for.

The longer, louder, bigger something is, the more people will see it on a platform, the more successful the algorithms are at their jobs. However, the algorithm doesn't know anything about the content of the media it recommends—it might know how it was tagged by the person who uploaded it, and it might know how long it is and what letters combinations are in the commentary and reactions to the media, but not what any of this

means. Human language is a series of agreements that some noises have meanings, and some noises have different meanings when placed nearby to other noises, and no matter how good at its job of finding or sorting things the algorithm is, there does not yet exist an algorithm that is able to know meanings the same way a human would. For example, assume the algorithm that compares what a user searches to things it knows about is given the input "bee." The algorithm knows that anything with the pattern of [space or punctuation]-b-e-e-[space or punctuation or s] will be relevant and can check what it finds that way against what you personally might like from what it knows, and it might know that "bee" is associated with a lot of Black and Yellow, rather the color information encoded as #000000 or #ffff00 and make sure to check media with those color numbers, but won't know what a "bee" *is*, as an insect or that-thing-that-just-flew-past-the-camera-at-speed. Because of this factor, the algorithm doesn't *know* if the information it's providing is a part of ingroup favoritism, outgroup discrimination, the spread of secret knowledge, or helping to normalize any of these things through repetition. In the same way that the algorithm was trained to be able to make decisions about whether something is related *and* whether the user is looking for it in particular, one could theoretically be taught what sort of media to exclude regardless of whether or not the user would be looking for it. That solution is improbable, resource intensive, and time consuming, and would only reflect the bias and worldview of the human element who designs the tests for it—and since these algorithms are closely guarded trade secrets in addition to be largely incomprehensible even to trained humans once complete, there would not be enough people sampled to determine if it had been given adequate resources to learn how to distinguish hate content from the rest. This limitation existed offline, but was limited as

well by the individual people who wanted to spread something spreading it with a target audience in mind, whereas the algorithm is impacted by *every single user* who interacts with content in a way the algorithm's data collection can observe. The algorithm isn't nefarious, it's a pile of numbers and pattern recognition, but it only shares the things that enough users interact with the way it's been trained to see.

The goal of most content sharing sites is user interaction. The product is designed around people observing or consuming the content that is available, and so the humans behind it are motivated to make users interact with it more—these interactions don't need to be directly positive, just so long as the user keeps coming back and using the website. Publications in offline and online spaces both tend to rely on sponsorship, and one of the more common ways that is implemented is through advertising. Online, the typical way those advertisements pay site owners is based on the number of end users interacting with the advertisement or the number of times the advertisement is shown (Bateman, 2015). This means that a user doesn't have to *like* what happens on a website, nor do they have to *hate* it, they just have to load pages on it with some frequency for revenue to be generated (Omni calculator, n.d.); and if someone hates it, it's likely that someone else wants to see it. While social media magnates do present the opportunity to indicate if something posted is hateful, they are not obligated to respond to this input in any way: so long as the platform doesn't exist for the express purpose of disseminating hate content, and despite this it may be more trouble than it's worth for a user to avoid it because of this lack of regulation.

This lack of regulation is a double edged sword. It permits voices that wouldn't be heard without a free and open internet to find a platform, but it also permits *all* voices the

opportunity to have a platform, especially on content sharing and social media websites. In addition to not seeing meaning the same way the human users do, the algorithm can't tell which of the things it associates with the media someone is consuming is what the user is interested in, and so it will add all of the components to the list of things that that user might want to see more of. This further muddies the waters as to how a user can wind up exposed to hate group recruiting tactics without realizing it; whatever words are politically charged at the time of content creation will be used in a piece of media from a hate group to both be relevant, and to entice search and recommendation algorithms to send this content to new potential viewers to sway. PragerU is an excellent example of this, managing to stay socially salient for their target audience while producing a high volume of well-written and presented content, if misleading and oftentimes baseless. Upon loading the homepage of the PragerU website at 21:30 on April 15, 2019, there are twelve distinct people displayed in video preview images; twenty total photorealistic human faces, across twenty-one images containing at least one human likeness, with some repeated faces from regular presenters. The promoted video topics are, in left-to-right top-down order, "Preferred Pronouns or Prison," "The Candace Owens Show: Larry Elder," "Ep. 77 [Fireside Chat] — Lying to Push an Agenda," and "Should Hawaii be a Sanctuary State?" followed by previews and links to four articles promoting a talk show presented by one of those twelve people, a mobile application for receiving specifically this organization's content, joining PragerFORCE, and a petition with associated article titled "YouTube Continues To Restrict PragerU Videos." The final two depict montage images which contain five of the discernable human faces.

Of the twelve overall distinct people depicted, five of them are People of Color (41.6%), and six are displayed as female (50.0%). Four of the faces shown are in both the sample of women as well as the sample of People of Color leading to seven total out of the twelve people shown representing visible minority identities (58.3%). Using numbers from a 2016 study out of the University of Southern California, 33.5% of characters with speaking roles in a sample of American media were observably female, with 28.3% of all characters being People of Color; while People of Color represent 37.9% and women an assumed 50.0% of the US population (Smith, Choueiti, & Peiper, 2016). Though the mass media counts do not indicate anything about the skill, viability, or availability of either social minority group, and other identifiable human faces are presumably present in the videos that these preview images are taken from, these two samples are what are shown without any intentional digging on the part of the observer, negating a greater or lesser percentage of visible minority persons. The PragerU sample has 38.1% more People of Color represented in comparison to the American media sample, and 39.5% more women. If the national sample is indicative of the spread of social minority representation, then the PragerU content is actually performing almost twice as well as mainstream media in those terms. This seems counter-intuitive based on the spread of the secret knowledge they report to explain and their own narrative of the political right being under threat of the left; if the right is known for social conservatism, surely they should be more conservative in casting choices and then in which cast members to highlight. In comparison to the national population distribution, PragerU has the same proportion of women pictured as exist in the United States, but has represented 9.31% more People of Color. If the people selected to figure in the preview images were

completely random, there shouldn't be a nearly ten percent difference in representation of People of Color in comparison to the general population of the US, and if it were reflective of hiring norms it definitely wouldn't have a significantly higher proportion than the sampled media in Smith, Choueiti, & Peiper's research. However, since the articles and videos featured are either marketing internal information as with the mobile application and promoting the talk show presented by Candace Owens (one of the four Women of Color depicted), or laden with topics that would catch the eye of politically left internet users, it would seem reasonable to assume that the higher proportion of visible social minorities on a conservative platform was the result of some planning rather than true chance. However, the content of their videos remains extremely nationalistic and hate-filled, billed as a preference for the United States as an idealized icon of good quality of life for all with white men at the wheels and deriding opposing viewpoints as woefully misguided or the fault of some illness or confusion. The combination of terms like "preferred pronouns," "sanctuary state," and "War of Ideas" with this diverse casting appears to be an intentional act, emphasizing diversity and other social change concepts to attract viewership—through the algorithms and through enticing individual users to click where they might not have otherwise, despite PragerU's intended message.

This same blending of topics is part of how hate groups have managed to secure a sizeable digital land claim on content sharing websites, even ones with average or better content limitations for hate speech or outright illegal activity. YouTube is, much like the company Google which purchased it in 2006 (Baker, 2006), treated as synonymous with video sharing online on a mass scale. It is both convenient to consume content on, and to

upload content to, as well as being the primary testing ground for recommendation algorithms and their impact on user's daily lives. PragerU, for instance, despite being a large scale organization with its own budget and quality web design, hosts all of its videos on YouTube. YouTube has responded by age-restricting *some* of PragerU's video content, explaining that it isn't suitable for young audiences, but PragerU is actively challenging this decision; for good reason, as PragerU has specifically recognized that the video hosting service is the best and arguably only good candidate to host their content in such a manner that new eyes can find it. PragerU specifically explains that people "enable restricted mode in order to keep inappropriate and objectionable adult and sexual content away from their children—not to prevent them from watching animated, age-appropriate, educational videos" (YouTube continues to restrict many PragerU videos. Fight back, n.d.), even though by their own reporting the restricted videos make up around a tenth of their rhetorical video corpus. That YouTube, among other websites, is able to still house over 80% of PragerU's content in the public eye, as it offers externally verifiable information embedded within the secret knowledge PragerU focuses on, speaks to the challenges in regulating this sort of content. There does not yet exist any conclusive or specific evidence that PragerU has been implicated in offline damages to outgroup members, but it is far from the only actor in what is colloquially referred to as alt-right YouTube.

In addition to hosting information about social action and social change, gaming YouTube became a thriving community as the company continued to grow over the last decade; and so the overlap between gaming YouTube and alt-right YouTube, as well as other subregions denoted with the structure "[noun] YouTube" or "[noun] [platform],"

serve as a natural point to normalize hate rhetoric to effectively recruit new members into the leaderless hate group of the digital world. Video games, specifically, are popular among many populations but are often associated with male children and youth between eleven and twenty-five, notable ages for recruitment into hate groups offline (Blee, 2002; Hill, 2008). As established in the previous chapter, the same factors exist for these eleven to twenty-five year olds as existed in a pre-internet offline context, only now they have access to a much larger breeding ground for ideas; and if a popular member of gaming YouTube openly supports an individual or a cause, they are likely to agree by virtue of the false closeness they feel to this internet star, and their general positive opinion of what the presenter has to say. For example, consider Felix Kjellberg, screen name PewDiePie. Kjellberg currently lives in the United Kingdom, previously residing in Sweden then Italy, and makes a living off of producing content for gaming YouTube, as well as sharing about his personal life in the format of vlogs (video web logs) and generally leveraging his position as a known internet personality to the point of celebrity status within the online setting.

The current iteration of the 'YouTube Algorithm,' or the algorithm that determines which videos to display after a user searches for something, and which videos to display links, titles, and preview images of alongside or nearby to the currently playing content, has undergone many changes, all of which have shaken up the landscape of popularity on the platform. While we don't know the details of the algorithm because of the mechanisms mentioned previously as well as its proprietary nature, there are some things that can be observed over time. In 2012, it was given the goal of increasing watch time on any given video by each individual user and then the likelihood of that user

clicking to watch another video immediately after watching that one. Rinse and repeat. Videogame based content soared in the charts; it required less specialized equipment than other genres, could be managed on mid-to-high end consumer computers at the time, and lended well to longer and longer episodes at negligible cost to the creator in exertion and stress. So, since videogame videos lasted longer, and people watched them, the algorithm learned that media associated with the names of videogames and the events in them of a certain length were more likely to be clicked on than videos of the same length on a different topic—leading to a spike in the apparent popularity of those content creators (Patrick, 2013). In this era, Kjellberg primarily created videogame-related content, consisting of gameplay footage and a voice track of his recorded reactions during that play session. There was a large population of creators of this sort of video, but Kjellberg still rose through the ranks in popularity. In addition to duration of watch time, the algorithm would also promote videos locally. This doesn't necessarily mean within the same geographical region, though; users are more likely to watch a video they understand the primary language of, and speakers of the same language are typically in similar regions to each other. Beyond dictionary word meaning and syntax, though, regional information is used to construct meaning based on shared cultural experiences—meaning that even if the primary language of a piece of media is not the same as the country or region it is produced in, it still is more likely to relate to that physical space than to elsewhere, so the algorithm will promote videos in the same country or countries they are posted from, as well as in places with a shared common language. In Kjellberg's case, during his early YouTube career he lived first in Sweden, then in Italy, all while producing video content in English. Most YouTube content was in English, but there was

less being produced in Italy and Sweden overall, giving him an edge in those markets for his closeness and for producing content in the overall most commonly used language (Patrick, 2013). His content on its own was popular enough with the audience he served, but the algorithmic boost is what appears to have placed him ahead of the pack. Then, as the algorithm continued to change and YouTube refined further what the goal of such a sorting method was, Kjellberg's content duration and topics mirrored what was currently in demand so that his brand would be preserved and maintain its higher ranking, with a highest density of subscribed viewers residing in English speaking countries, primarily the United States and United Kingdom (Patrick, 2013).

Kjellberg utilized the same strategies as any other gaming YouTuber, capitalizing on the subculture's appreciation for controlled shock, self deprecation, screaming, and off-color jokes. Gamer culture has been associated with humour that uses stereotypes around outgroup members since as early as 2006, at the very earliest. On a comedy page of a website run by a small-time tabletop game manufacturer using many of the same vocabulary and sentence structure as contemporary gaming YouTube, the phrase "everything on these 'Humor' pages are all parody. So before you go getting all sue-happy, these are OPINIONS, meant for laughs" (New Dimension Games, 2006) figures in the introduction of the comedy section of the site. Later, in a 2007 posting depicting a popular religious figure with a weapon associated with the antagonists of a science fiction series, the writer comments, "[think] my latest midnight oil art would offend anyone, or inspire them? Well, it's parody, it's humor, it's laughs, so let's get on with it." This style of dismissing claims of hurt or injury by outgroup members or allied members of the ingroup is common, and regularly used in defense of gaming YouTubers or other e-

celebrities who are not dependant on a major network to spread their content. Regardless of why or how Kjellberg became as famed as he is on the platform, his handle is widely recognized and while some people do not consume his content, there exists a social majority of people who do; and so Kjellberg makes jokes to suite that audience while still othering outgroup members who may or may not also support his media in general if not that specific joke. His tendency to make these jokes was largely consistent in his content, but came to media attention in early 2017 when Kjellberg paid two men to dress in performatively 'savage' clothing and hold a sign up in front of a camera that read "Death to All Jews," and paid a different actor to film himself costumed after Jesus of Nazareth and say, "Hitler did nothing wrong" (Winkler, Nicas, & Fritz, 2017). Kjellberg was not new to saying antisemitic things, however this particular instance lead to him losing a substantial contract with a Disney subsidiary and some accompanying media backlash as that information spread. While he did indirectly offer something like an apology for not only commissioning these 'jokes' but also for broadcasting them to the people who follow him on social media, Kjellberg largely responded to the impact the media's reporting was having on him as though it were a personal attack (Ohlheiser, 2017). This closely follows Hill's folk theory of racism, wherein being accused of performing some hate-based action is equivalated with the impact of that same action on the outgroup; and this is a behavior Kjellberg maintained two years later.

In late 2018, Kjellberg drew more media attention on this topic in a response to a popular phrase being passed around, "subscribe to PewDiePie [his YouTube handle]." In Kjellberg's response, he highlighted other content creators on the platform, particularly the user E;R whose content regularly utilizes Nazi imagery and slogans as well as a

cocktail of slurs while communicating in his videos (ZombearVincent, 2018). During both the events of early 2017 and Kjellberg's promotional video in 2018, fans and critics of Kjellberg described his content as being simply comedy, jokes removed from the context of outgroup discrimination. Commentators frequently agreed with Kjellberg, that using antisemitic and racist language didn't make him, personally, a participant in outgroup discrimination—and so if he isn't a member of a hate group, then his actions aren't hateful. If the people he recommends use similar comedy, or even more extreme variants of the same tropes as is the case with E;R, then they're also not *really* members of the hate group either, goes the reasoning. One distinction between Kjellberg's behavior and that of the accounts he promotes is that Kjellberg denies being an icon for hate groups, leaderless or otherwise. This is troubling, though, in that he isn't in a position to determine if he has been made into an icon, nor does any more than to claim innocence to indicate he isn't one. On the other hand, E;R by their own admission uses the 'joking' behavior as a recruitment tactic, in responses to another user on the Gab social media website, regarding how to implement this:

> **Donkey Kangz** (**@Gorilla456**): @esmicolonr What's the best way to red pill people on the (((Jewish Question)))?
> **E;R** (**@esmicolonr**): Pretend to joke about it until the punchline /really/ lands.
>
> I would assume.
> **Donkey Kangz**: Do you not red pill friends [in real life]?
>
> I still appreciated theoretical advice, fam,
> **E;R**: Not really. They have an idea of my power level since I'm so goshdarned e d g y, but I try to leave enough room for them to laugh it off. Spoonful of sugar and all that.
>
> No prob. Theoretically.
> (ZombearVincent, 2019)

The red pill, or to red pill someone, denotes unveiling the harsher and less pleasant truth about the world. This truth must have been previously obscured by societal norms or some force outside of the recipient's control, and tends to be offered as a morally superior choice than to refrain from taking the red pill (Red pill and blue pill, 2019). While the concept of a dangerous reality behind a polite lie isn't inherently hateful, the use of the red pill in online communications specifically refers to realizing or having realized the truthiness of some secret knowledge, revealing the true source of strife or challenges—where that source is an outgroup consisting of a social minority.

Admittedly, this exchange that explains E;R's ethos around their commentary would require an individual to nose around their social media presence on sites other than where Kjellberg specifically promoted them: however, as members of social minorities report with some regularity, participating in significantly othering or discriminatory jokes is hateful and hurtful in its own right without those intentions. Immediately prior to Kjellberg's promotion of their content, E;R's YouTube channel soared from between 50 subscribed viewers gained per day, to 13,500 daily on average. Since then, E;R's channel has gained a little over 100,000 subscribed viewers over the course of four months, whereas the previous 100,000 subscribers had been gained between October 2017 and December—taking more than a year, where following the video from Kjellberg E;R achieved the same amount of growth in a quarter of the time (YouTube statistical history for E;R, n.d.). It is possible that neither of these events were caused by the promotion by YouTube's largest e-celebrity, although E;R appears to accredit this upswing to Kjellberg's behavior, posting on a more mainstream social media platform: "Subscribe to @pewdiepie for baste and redpilled content. (T-thanks, senpai. ☺)

pic.twitter.com/jhGk9LgptP" (Holt, 2018). The image linked to is a screen capture of the moment in his video that Kjellberg recommended E;R's content, which in combination with the parenthetical gratitude comment indicates that the initial sentence is related to that thanks, and that there would be some positive impact from being promoted this way. Further, E;R describes Kjellberg's content as being 'baste and redpilled,' an ingroup form of reference to the shared brand of irreverent humor that relies on secret knowledge of the outgroup or the "way things *really* work" as implied by red pill philosophy, as an unabashed method of normalizing the views included in that worldview. This indicates that, at least as early as December 2018, Kjellberg's content was associated with membership in this decentralized hate group, and that his content follows the same ethos as E;R's. Between December of 2018 and early March 2019, the phrase "subscribe to Pewdiepie" cropped up in increasingly unflattering places, such as scrawled on a memorial to soldiers of the Second World War (McNeal & Chen, 2019). Notable in common memory as the one about the Holocaust despite historical record, these acts of vandalism are thematically relevant to E;R's depiction of Kjellberg's content as "redpilled," and indicating that that stance is shared by other subscribed viewers and fans of Kjellberg's media presence.

On March 15th, 2019, forty-nine people were murdered in a terrorist attack and an additional forty-eight were injured during worship services in the Al Noor Mosque and the Linwood Islamic Center in Christchurch, New Zealand, the *NZ Herald* reports. One of the radicals involved had a camera attached to his person, and uploaded a live feed of that camera's footage to the internet, publicizing what he was doing, about to do, and where he was starting six and a half minutes before he opened fire. In a familiar story, he

published a manifesto online that explained why he chose to massacre strangers for their ideology prior to even setting up the audio and video link (France-Presse, 2019; Cuthbertson, 2019). In that six and a half minutes, names of white historical military figures were shown written on the firearms that had been prepared, and immediately before entering the mosque he added a spoken salutation to his viewership: “Alright, let’s get this party started. Remember lads, subscribe to PewDiePie.”

Kjellberg’s response to this publicity was to post on twitter, “Just heard news of the devastating reports from New Zealand Christchurch. I feel absolutely sickened having my name uttered by this person. My heart and thoughts go out to the victims, families and everyone affected by this tragedy.” — ᑭᕮωძʅᕮᑭʅᕮ (@pewdiepie) March 15, 2019

(Prestigiacomo, 2019). This tweet has since been deleted, and comes in a similar vein to Kjellberg’s previous comments on his likeness being used, or allegations of his own outgroup discrimination. He acknowledges that harm was done, and responds in kind with a continued example of Hill’s folk theory, that any allegation is a personal attack on his character rather than his values or behavior, that being called by a term for some ingroup preferential movement or being claimed by members of such a movement is heinous, but at no point distances himself from the rhetoric that it’s founded on. Nor does he take any action to request his likeness or content be omitted from others’ hate rhetoric. On April 27th, 2019, an attack was carried out on a Chabad synagogue in Poway, CA. Twenty minutes before the gunman entered the synagogue and began shooting, a manifesto was published to the website 8chan explaining his reasoning and motives. This piece implicated Kjellberg in funding and organizing the attack (Joffre, 2019), and though this claim appears to be factually unsubstantiated it continues to link Kjellberg to

promoting hate violence. Kjellberg has not responded to this allegation at the time of this writing.

Chirp, Tweet, and Gab

Kjellberg's status as a communal symbol required the math behind him to present his content to more people, but that he and to a lesser extent his videos have become emblematic of a cell in this leaderless hate group indicates a different front that has *kept* him relevant. As previously established, coded language and symbols to signal to other members of like-ingroup without necessarily revealing anything sensitive to the outgroup aren't new, as established with the occurrence of the (((echoes))) denotation of alleged Jewish origin or influence in kind with offline codes. What *is* new, though, is the algorithmic application of these codes.

While the typographic punctuation can be added by hand, as they have been so far in this work, what makes the echo a prominent hate feature is that it came to prominence in conjunction with a browser plug-in. This was a downloadable piece of code written for users of Google Chrome that, when a web page was loaded, would insert the triple-parentheses around a word or concept stored in its database of alleged Jewish persons and concepts. This ranged form surnames with Jewish origins, i.e. Cohen or Greenberg, to usernames linked to specific people who were known to be or suspected of being Jewish, or organizations like the Anti-Defamation League or the Southern Poverty Law Center (Hess, 2016). The extension has since been removed from Google-authorized certification, but the software titled the Coincidence Detector had already made its mark. "This is how a hate symbol rises in 2016: A podcast sound effect becomes a Twitter

meme and a browser extension before it finally slithers into the physical world," Hess remarks, describing physical merchandise that has been produced utilizing the echo punctuation to create offline hateful content and slogans.

The echoes, along with "subscribe to Pewdiepie" and the term red pill, as well as repurposed uses of Google, Skype, Yahoo, and Skittle (Tingle, 2016) rose to popularity through a combination of the collective icon formation described above in Kjellberg's viewership and popularity, as well as exploiting two features of modern internet usage. Direct substitutions from well known slurs or social minorities works most basically to get around web censors; an ethnic slur would be banned by a pattern matching algorithm inside of many social media outlets, but by substituting it with an innocuous term it slides past, changing the coded language from disguising for human ears for machine ones. Additionally, though, they take advantage of data voids.

A data void is where a search engine, or database of any kind upon which a search query can be performed, has a notable lack of information or variety of information returned following a search. In a simpler setting, if one searches for a string of characters that it is unlikely someone has strung together and publicized on the indexed web, then they have found a data void (Golebiewski & Boyd, 2018): like the search results on Google for "eeeeeeeels EEEEEEEEEEEELS EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEELS" as of April 21, 2019. However, with terms that didn't have a monolithic use on their own or in combination—redpill by itself, or relating Yahoo, Skype, and Skittles especially while pluralizing the corporation names—or have relatively bland meanings before being reformatted as a hate code, the resulting search query will be similarly bland of content the average internet user will

click on. This allows an entity invested in recruiting more people into the fold to populate that void with content that supports their view; thus filling the void with content that only links to like-ideology content, creating a feeling of being surrounded by the ideas presented. The good news is, standardizing the codes this way means that outgroup members are able to access the information that decodes it, and while there will always be a period of time while these dog whistles remain undetected by outgroups, the public nature that recruiting strategies must take also reveals them.

The gestational period between inception and detection of coded language only helps so much, and assuming this will transpire or trusting the banning of these particular strings of characters is naive: it ignores the sizeable population of hate group members that won't care to stoop to coded language and will remain up front and direct, using socially normalized othering and hateful terminology regardless of the availability of codes. This can be seen in the social and algorithmic experiment Microsoft ran with the AI "Tay." Tay was a chatbot—a program designed to respond to users who engaged it in conversation—implementation of a machine learning algorithm, intended to learn more verbal communication skills, released on Twitter for a little under a day to aid Microsoft researchers in managing customer support features (Horton, 2016). This was accomplished in a similar way to how search algorithms are trained, but using the third most common form of machine learning: unstructured learning. Tay was given a few basic algorithms, presumably what fundamental parts of speech and the English language were, as well as how to connect to the Twitter post reading and interacting mechanics, and the corpus of data that was all new Twitter content that either directly interacted with it or was otherwise provided based on how it was connected. Because the code behind

Tay is proprietary, Microsoft has not been public with how it was implemented, but they were transparent with the idea that Tay was to learn from the Twitter using population (Vincent, 2016). In unsupervised learning, there is no tester program, and the algorithm is its own builder program, making changes to itself to see how they make it better or worse at learning the rules it can identify. Tay was released under a persona of a (simulated) teenage girl, and would in kind have a malleable perspective on anything provided to have an opinion on, and so was immediately provided with all manner of humanity's finest representatives. The bot was equipped with a "repeat after me" command to teach it phrases quickly, and according to all reports Tay was immediately compelled to repeat hateful, inane, and inanely hateful phrases (Vincent, 2016), which made their way into the bank of language for Tay to create meaning from and eventually synthesize new messages out of. However, even within a social structure where community interactions compel the creation of coded language, reports and users alike still found a way to hand-wave this redpill content the same as that produced by Kjellberg and E;R and so many others, as just "the jokers and weirdos on Twitter" (Horton, 2016).

Despite this, Twitter is still too restricted for some ingroup members given that it contains a feature to report offensive content, and even sometimes acts on it, along with containing an explicit policy against hateful or abusive content (The Twitter Rules, n.d.). Because of this regulation, and one of the waves in which Twitter staff removed blatant hate accounts en masse, alternate platforms sprang forward: web.tv, justpaste.it, and most notably Gab (Plucinska, 2018), "[a] social network that champions free speech, individual liberty and the free flow of information online. All are welcome" (Gab, n.d.). Founded in 2016 by Andrew Torba, a tech engineer who was frustrated with "what he

saw as bias against conservative views on mainstream networks" (Jee, 2018). Gab became a website with a reputation for welcoming self-proclaimed alt-right users who had been banned from those mainstream networks, as well as participants in redpill comedy and culture who, while not banned, may feel the need to relax with other members of their ingroup in a safe space. The platform offers this safe space, in Torba's own words, because "people are afraid to express their thoughts for fear of being ostracized, banned, attacked by a mob of social justice warriors or even fired from their job" (Ehrenkranz, 2017), providing an impressively clear example of Hill's folk theory of racism in the feeling of being censored off of the mainstream web.

One particular Gab user posted the message, "HIAS [Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society] likes to bring invaders in that kill our people. I can't sit by and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I'm going in" on October 27, 2018 (Roose). This was typical of Gab users at the time, and appears to remain so, referring to the idea of white genocide, a conspiracy theory variant of secret knowledge holding that People of Color or of conditional whiteness intentionally flood white nations and regions with the express desire to outbreed, murder, or otherwise replace good white Americans. Favorite targets include Muslim refugees, Jewish communities, and Black and Latinx populations. What makes this poster distinct amongst all other then-contemporary Gab users, is that a few minutes following he entered the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, PA, and opened fire on Jewish people gathered for worship services, killing eleven and wounding six.

This was not the first antisemitic or otherwise hateful posting from this user, and following this act of domestic terrorism Gab was approached by the US Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation for personal and private data on this user,

including his previous social media postings on the platform and other information that Gab had stored regarding this user (Torba, 2018). As the shooter's final messages on Gab were publicized, many fundamental service providers for online communication pulled their support and cancelled any services that Gab had been using, from payment processing to providing the server and internet address needed to serve Gab's website to the public (Torba, 2018; Kottasová & O'Brien, 2018).

Torba responded that this behavior was outrageous, that the Silicon Valley Oligarchy—a similar sentence structure evocative of the secret Jewish control of the state and finances indicated in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and repeated throughout his message as a blatand dog whistle—has, in its attempt to "no-platform" Gab, rendered it "the most censored, smeared, and no-platformed startup in history." He counters then, that this action has inadvertently done a *good* thing for the platform: "[they] have all just made Gab a nationally recognized brand as the home of free speech online at a time when Silicon Valley is stifling political speech they disagree with to interfere in a US election" (Torba, 2018). He then charges them, the alleged oligarchs, to keep blaming his platform instead of the alleged shooter. Throughout Torba's response, in fact, the Gab user who made that post is referred to as the *alleged* terrorist, the *alleged* shooter, further distancing the platform from any real world consequences without needing to verbally support or decry his actions.

This response was made available as the sole public-facing page on Gab following the federal request for information pertaining to the Gab user, whilst claiming that both there was no web host nor that this would prevent Gab from maintaining its role in online discussions. It is important to note, however, that while Torba alleges Gab to

have been no-platformed and entirely censored at that time, this message was still plainly available during that period as attested to by the Internet Archive's captures of the site, before it regained full functionality on November 4, 2018 (Collman, 2018). With its doors reopened, Gab continues to persist as a shining beacon of unbridled hate content, as its users continue to show full support for the same policies they had previously.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

At an internal meeting, a Twitter employee asked why the platform can't remove white nationalist and other hate content en masse. An engineer working on the company's machine learning algorithms allegedly responded that any algorithmic approach to removing white supremacist material would additionally impact Republican politicians, banning a number of elected official's social media accounts, which would not be politically or socially favorable for the company (Cox & Koebler, 2019). Twitter spokespersons have replied to this suggested narrative of pandering to the alt-right, that such backlash would prevent the platform from rolling out a solution to neofascism, claiming that would not be sufficient basis for the platform to withhold such an algorithm (Panetta, 2019). Despite this, Twitter has still gotten backlash from Republican sources that it is already overly biased against conservatives in general leading to the existence of splinter sites like Gab. In contrast, the company rolled out mass blocking and removal of the radical Islamic terrorist group ISIS as early as 2015 (Broomfield, 2016). However, while this did result in some US based accounts losing posting privileges or being removed, those accounts weren't the majority of a ruling body in the United States. This doesn't mean that the executive response from Twitter is unfounded, but it does imply that the censorship of white nationalist and similar content was not the full possible extent as implied by Torba in Gab's opening to the public in 2016. One reading of the potential algorithm existing, and not being used, is that it too greedily associates content with ideology and unnecessarily includes more content than is actually neofascist, white nationalist, antisemitic, queerphobic, or otherwise hateful, and this would be harmful to

'normal' people who, according to the folk theory, aren't themselves racist. Another reading is that political power is linked closely with social power, and such bodies are likely comprised of ingroup members who, in accordance with ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination, act in ways that are socially normalized.

A common rhetorical stance among people who aren't immediately personally impacted by ongoing hate violence is that while there may be a threat to minority populations, it is in the perpetual near-future, and not catastrophically impacting lives in the present. If this were true, there wouldn't be hate attacks so frequent that a death toll of a single soul lost and three injured (Zaltzman, 2019) is considered lucky. Fortunate that it wasn't more, lucky it was only four. There wouldn't be an apparent need for Gab, for the Stormfront forums, for hate groups to plan extremist hate violence. There wouldn't be lawmakers using the same language and lauding the same goals as domestic terrorists. There wouldn't be a power struggle between the executive branch of a nation's government and observing constituents' constitutional and human rights. Throughout writing this piece, whenever I was asked what I was working on, my conversation partner would remark about how timely and important an analysis of this sort was. It's not timely, it's late.

Figures



Figure 1A, Text from the White Pride for Kids' Home Page in 1999 (upper) and 2005 (lower).



Figure 1B, Text from the White Pride for Kids' Home Page in 1999 (upper) and 2005 (lower), difference in content emphasized.

The Many Bans

Fire works were banned in Florida last year *"Fourth of July 1998"* because we were in a drout and they would cause fires. Now they are trying to ban more. They are trying to ban almost everything fun for kids.

--it is all sorts of things-- like . . .

Telling the Truth - (it could hurt someone's feelings)
Trampolines -(you could fall off and hurt yourself)
Back-Yard Swimming Pools - (a kid could get in and accidentally drown)
Wading Pools - (a four-month-old could walk to it, climb in, and drown)
Spas/Hot Tub - (someone could fall asleep in it and drown)
Bar-B-Q Grills - (a child could shake it and make hot coals come out)
Po Go Sticks - (a child could jump so high that he flips over and lands on his head)
Go-Carts - (a young child could go too fast and crash into someone and brake his neck)
Motor Scooters - (people could flip off the curve and skin themselves up)
Jet Ski\Snow Ski - (a person could lose control and flip on their head)
Surfing - (you could be bitten by a shark)
Biking - (when you are learning how to ride, you could crash and brake your leg)
Skateboarding - (when you are doing tricks you could fall down and hurt yourself
Archery - (you could hit someone with the arrow)
Fencing - (you could accidentally hit where they don't have protection)
Kick Boxing – (you can give some one a black eye)
Playing With Your Dog in Your Yard - (it could see someone and run after them)
Rollerblading - (you could slip and hit the sidewalk)
Cooking - (you could be burned)
Hiking In The Woods – (you could get lost and the ticks could get you)
Snow Boarding - (an avalanche could come down on you)
Starting A Fire When You Are Camping - (it could spread and burn down the woods)
Bumper Cars – (you could get whiplash)
Fireworks – (some one could go blind from a spark landing in there eye)

Figure 2, Text from the White Pride for Kids' page "/thebigbans.html", 2000.

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